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Abstract 
This paper describes an approach for detecting the presence or emergence of organised crime (OC) signals on social 
media. It shows how words and phrases, used by members of the public in social media posts, can be treated as weak 
signals of OC, enabling information to be classified according to a taxonomy. Formal concept analysis is used to group 
information sources, according to crime-type and location, thus providing a means of corroboration and creating OC 
concepts that can be used to alert police analysts to the possible presence of OC. The analyst is able to ‘drill down’ into 
an OC concept of interest, discovering additional information that may be pertinent to the crime. The paper describes 
the implementation of this approach into a fully-functional prototype software system, incorporating a social media 
scanning system and a map-based user interface. The approach and system are illustrated using human trafficking 
and modern slavery as an example. Real data is used to obtain results that show that weak signals of OC have been 
detected and corroborated, thus alerting to the possible presence of OC.
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Introduction
The vociferous proliferation of the Internet, and more 
recently social media, into society and the everyday 
lives of its citizens has, over the last fifteen or so years, 
resulted in a sea-change in the behaviours and percep-
tions we have in relation to the information that is shared 
freely online [1]. Such behaviour has resulted in the crea-
tion of a vast repository of information that holds poten-
tial value as an intelligence resource, and the emergence 
of the open-source researcher as a valuable skill-set 
within the analytical repertoire of the police and other 
security agencies. Resources such as social media, RSS 
news feeds, interactive street-maps and online directory 
services all provide valuable stores of information that 
can be used to support existing investigative and analyti-
cal practices in response to serious and organised crime. 
This paper’s novelty concerns the application of formal 
concept analysis (FCA) in combination with automated 
information retrieval and natural language processing 
(NLP) tools to identify, extract, categorise and corrobo-
rate information from open web sources which may be 
used to identify the early onset of organised crime. Spe-
cifically, the paper looks to identify what we will refer 
to as ‘weak signals’, and looks to transform these signals 
into corroborated alerts linked to the presence or emer-
gence of organised crime activity, including gang activity, 
the trade and use of illegal narcotics, gun crime, human 
trafficking, and modern slavery. This research described 
in this paper forms part of a larger project; ePOOLICE 
(early Pursuit against Organised crime using environ-
mental scanning, the Law and IntelligenCE systems). The 
project, which concluded in 2016, aimed to develop a 
prototype environmental scanning system, integrating a 
number of promising and mature technical components 
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to semantically filter information from open-sources, 
such as the web and social media, to identify information 
that may constitute weak-signals of organised crime. The 
project sought to identify the extent to which the organ-
ised crime threats could be detected at an early stage, 
prior to their development into larger more resilient 
criminal systems, through the automated collection and 
analysis of data from open sources [2]. These sources pri-
marily contain information from news outlets, journalists 
and other outlets, but also take into account posts made 
by ’normal’ citizens. The project incorporated the input of 
domain experts and practitioners throughout, including 
law enforcement agencies from the UK, Spain and Ger-
many, and international organisations such as EUROPOL 
and the United Nations Interregional Organised Crime 
Research Institute (UNICRI). The input of these organi-
sations in particular, alongside other practitioners from 
the projects advisory board, were leveraged in the extrac-
tion of requirements, using a combination of question-
naires, interviews and workshop session throughout the 
software development lifecycle, right through to their 
eventual testing and evaluation.
The concept of weak signals has been abstracted from 
the Canadian Criminal Intelligence Service’s (CISC) defi-
nitions of primary and secondary indicators [3], and the 
perception that in reality there is little tangible value to 
be extracted from isolated indicators as there is potential 
for them to be symptomatic of a variety of phenomena, 
many of which are not necessarily in any way indicative 
of the presence or threat of organised crime. However, 
when these indicators are grouped under certain con-
ditions, such as temporal or geographic proximity to a 
specific location and type of activity, they can begin to 
provide insight into the presence or emergence of crime. 
It is with this definition, and the notion of ‘weak signals’ 
that we use as the basis of this paper and the approach 
presented within it. In UK practice, the college of policing 
guidance on the use of open-source intelligence (OSINT) 
[4] is fairly limited, and no special provisions are made 
for social media services as a potential intelligence 
source. The main uses of open-sources in this respect are 
to develop an understanding of the locations relevant to 
a piece of analysis, to identify social and demographic 
changes, to identify external factors that may impact on 
crime, disorder and community concerns, to support and 
develop investigations by indicating lines of enquiry or 
the corroboration of other information, and to support 
the development of subject and problem profiles through 
the development of intelligence products.
Perhaps the greatest shift in the use of the internet over 
the last 10–15 years or so is the relative phenomenon that 
is the usage of Social Media among normal citizens. In 
the aftermath of the riots across London and a number 
of other English cities which followed the killing of Mark 
Duggan by the Metropolitan Police in 2011, a Her Maj-
esty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) commis-
sioned review highlighted significant inefficiencies in the 
the way that authorities were equipped to deal with social 
media as an intelligence source [5]. Social Media Intelli-
gence, or ‘SOCMINT’, provides opportunities for provid-
ing insights into events and groups, enhancing situational 
awareness, and enabling the identification of criminal 
intent, providing it is done so in a manner that is appro-
priately grounded in respect of human privacy rights [6]. 
Reports and case studies such as this have demonstrated 
the desire and scope for research in the field to explore 
its novel application in enhancing the decision making 
ability of key stakeholders, such as the police, with more 
recent events, and social media’s role in the response, 
such as the Boston, Massachusetts bombings in 2013 [7], 
only strengthening the case for its use.
In order to demonstrate the potential utility of SOC-
MINT, in respect of identifying the presence and/or 
emergence of organised crime, the problem domain of 
Human Trafficking will be used as the exemplar use-case 
throughout this paper. Human Trafficking operates on a 
vast scale with a truly global impact, with almost every 
country in the world acting as an origin, transit or des-
tination location for the movement and exploitation of 
human beings. Trafficking is so defined by article 3 of the 
Palermo protocol as the “recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of 
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power 
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiv-
ing of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person, for the pur-
pose of exploitation” [8]. In the UK, Human Trafficking 
and Modern Slavery has risen to prominence over recent 
years into a priority serious and organised crime threat, 
alongside issues like cybercrime, drug crime and child 
sexual exploitation (CSE) [9]. Although it is worth noting 
that due to recent legislative changes in the UK, it now 
falls under the banner of modern slavery which consoli-
dates existing legislation related to slavery and to human 
trafficking. However, due to the trans-European scope of 
this paper, we will refer mainly back to the principles of 
the Palermo protocol, using the term ‘Human Trafficking’ 
interchangeably with ‘Trafficking in Human Beings’.
Organisations such as Europol [10] are increasingly 
acknowledging growing criminal dependence on the 
internet and the increasingly trans-European perspective 
of serious and organised crime. These changes in the way 
that information is created and shared, combined with 
the diversity in the way that existing forms of criminality 
are being conducted provides the opportunity, and desire, 
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for the development of new means to assist law enforce-
ment in combating it. To provide one such approach to 
enable this, the tools described here facilitate the identi-
fication, extraction, processing, analysis and presentation 
of data from open sources, such as social media, that can 
reveal insight into the emergence and presence of crime 
both in an operational sense; by identifying specific phe-
nomena that are linked to discrete types of crime, and 
from a strategic perspective in the identification and 
visualisation of strategic trends through the corrobora-
tion of different crime indicators. While at one end of 
the scale international intelligence agencies such as the 
National Security Agency’s (NSA) PRISM programme 
are facilitating the acquisition, fusion and analysis of vast 
amounts of data from disparate sources [11], the (known) 
resources and capability of law enforcement agencies 
(both locally, regionally and even internationally) are rec-
ognised to be much more modest—with the use of data 
from open sources and social media often a manual task, 
and the remit of just a few specialist analysts and officers 
within each force [12].
Taxonomy of organised crime
In beginning to model its constituent elements it is nec-
essary to ascertain a thorough understanding of the 
actual problem domain—human trafficking, by drawing 
upon established definitions used to describe and diag-
nose the problem by the practitioner base. The UNODC 
[8] have defined, using the UN Palermo protocol as the 
basis, what they refer to as, the three constituent ‘ele-
ments’ of trafficking, these being the ‘act’, ‘means’ and 
‘purpose’, see Fig. 1. Firstly, the ‘act’ refers to what is being 
done, this can include context such as whether and how 
the victim has been recruited, transported, transferred or 
harboured. The question of how this is being achieved is 
answered by the ‘means’, which seeks to establish whether 
force is being used as the basis of manipulation, such as 
through kidnapping, abduction or the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities, or more subtle methods such as through 
fraud, imposing financial dependencies or coercion. The 
final element, the ‘purpose’ establishes the reason why 
the act and means are taking place, or to put it simply—
the form of exploitation behind the act and means, be it 
for forced labour, sexual exploitation and prostitution, 
organ harvesting or domestic servitude.
This definition and categorisation provides an ideal 
underpinning for the formation of a taxonomy of Human 
Trafficking that can be used to form the basis of an 
approach to automatically identify and extract valuable 
data from open sources (Fig. 2). This taxonomy in actual-
ity forms part of a larger model, consisting of elements 
of a broader range of organised crime threats, including 
the cultivation and distribution of illegal narcotics. The 
elements of the taxonomy are defined across four groups, 
visualised here using vertical columns. The first of these 
columns, starting from the left, is used as a high level 
categorisation used to separate between different crime 
types. The second deals with different elements within a 
specific type of crime—in this case one of the three com-
ponent parts of trafficking, while subsequent columns, 
type and element, are used to show further more special-
ised aspects of these elements.
Each of the nodes contained within the taxonomy rep-
resents a ruleset designed to determine the relevance of 
a piece of content, in this case a particular Twitter post-
ing’s relevance to the subject matter—human trafficking. 
The level of specialisation of the rules themselves fol-
lows the structure of the taxonomy, moving from more 
generic words or phrases that may indicate Human Traf-
ficking used at the higher levels of the taxonomy, whereas 
the more specialised end of the taxonomy, more nuanced 
rules that may allude to the presence of criminality are 
used. Running parallel to the process of content catego-
risation is the requirement for content (or named-entity) 
extraction. The specific content and nature of the rules 
is informed by the input of experts and practitioners in 
the field, elicited through workshops and additional desk 
based research around organised crime indicators. A 
more detailed discussion of the process of defining rules 
and the nature of these indicators is included in [13].
The process of extracting named-entities and facts 
varies in complexity, from the use of simple lookup 
tables containing keyword lists, to more sophisticated 
approaches making use of part-of-speech tagging and 
grammatical and predicate rules to detect the use of 
terms within specific contexts. Data such as this is most 
commonly available through social media services like 
Twitter. However, in reality, research suggests that less 
than 1% of all Twitter posts actually contain geo-loca-
tion information, thus making it necessary to pursue 
other approaches in order to increase the amount of 
potentially useful data available. In this regard, a num-
ber of approaches have been used, from simple keyword 
Fig. 1 The elements of human trafficking
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searches, to more complex algorithmic approaches. In 
one such example, researchers from IBM have developed 
an approach that uses the content of tweets that contain 
geotags, and then searches for similar content that does 
not contain them in order to assess areas where con-
tent may have originated from, as part of a larger piece 
Fig. 2 Organised crime taxonomy (excerpt)
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of research aimed at identifying the home location of 
Twitter users. The tests conducted as part of the study 
reported accuracy of around 58% [14]. Here however, the 
focus is somewhat different, whereby the approach seeks 
to extract context in relation to named entities to enable 
conclusions to be inferred about events or phenomena in 
specific, named locations.  
Weak signals of organised crime
To enable the development of a taxonomy that enables 
us to model and structure the information deemed use-
ful to extract we can refer to a wealth of literature from 
both academic and practitioner perspectives that pro-
vide insights into the factors that contribute to and indi-
cate organised crime. These indicators vary from high 
level, secondary information such as Political, Economic, 
Socio-cultural, Technological, Legal and Environmental 
(PESTLE) factors, right down to operationally oriented 
information that offers guidance on how to identify 
potential victims of trafficking. Existing models to antici-
pate changes and developments in organised criminality 
across geographic areas have focused on this kind of data 
alongside existing crime statistics [15].
In the past, and to some extent a problem that still 
exists, a lack of information and common understanding 
about what Human Trafficking is has hindered the impact 
and effectiveness of efforts to combat it [16]. Despite var-
ied and wide-ranging counter-trafficking initiatives from 
NGOs, Law Enforcement and Governments, reliable 
information regarding the magnitude and nature of traf-
ficking across regional and national borders is still hard 
to come by due to a number of issues around the sharing, 
fusion and understanding of data that is already being col-
lected [17]. The purpose of the approach developed and 
described in this paper is not to provide a statistically 
accurate representation of the presence and emergence of 
trafficking but rather to increase access to, and usability 
of, data from previously untapped open-sources. In pre-
vious work, we have discussed indicators across a three-
level model [13] moving from credible and accepted 
indicators of trafficking at level 1 of the model, through 
to the observations and content created online, including 
on social media, by citizens regarding these ‘weak signals’.
In this paper we discuss the latter and, more specifi-
cally, the modelling and use of this information as ‘weak 
signals’ that allude to the presence and/or emergence 
of criminality in citizen generated content, whilst using 
the formal definitions and doctrine that exists to under-
pin the framework and organisation of the model itself. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive list of indicators comes 
from the UNODC [18] who provide an extensive typol-
ogy categorised by different types of exploitation such 
as; domestic servitude, child sexual exploitation, labour 
exploitation and begging/petty crime—the labels used 
in the taxonomy structure are outlined in Fig.  2. Using 
sexual exploitation as an example, indicators include 
things such as the appearance that persons are under the 
specific control of another, that the person(s) appear to 
own little clothing, or rely on their employer for basic 
amenities, transport and accommodation and more. The 
taxonomy excerpt included in Fig. 3 shows at a high level 
how a taxonomy node focused on attributes which may 
Fig. 3 Organised crime taxonomy
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indicate an individual is vulnerable, or a potential victim 
of trafficking or exploitation, may contain specific rules 
designed to identify text which suggests they may have 
been subjected to violence, as one example of a weak-
signal. Although in this form, these indicators are quite 
abstract and it can be difficult to see how they may mani-
fest in real, open-source, data—it is possible to develop 
rules looking for keywords and phrases that can provide 
‘weak-signals’ of their existence online.
In order to facilitate the identification and extraction 
of these weak signals in social media and other open-
sources, what we will refer to as ‘contextual extraction’ 
methods [19] are used in order to identify, and subse-
quently extract, key entities and facts (i.e. previously 
unknown relationships between different entities) from 
the data. This approach to information extraction using 
natural-language processing builds upon the existing 
principles of template based information extraction [20], 
also sometimes referred to as ‘Atomic Fact Extraction’ 
[19]. These ‘facts’ enable the extraction of entities within 
a specific context, i.e. locations in relation to an arrest or 
type of exploitation on a per sentence basis.
A number of example entities are included in Table 1.
While in isolation, the extraction of these entities on 
their own does not necessarily provide much actionable 
information, it is possible using rules that attempt to infer 
relations between them to begin to make some assump-
tions about the data and its content. For example a single 
tweet may contain multiple locations and other enti-
ties, but without some means to establish a relationship 
between the two there is no way to automatically infer, 
with any confidence at least, that they are linked. Fortu-
nately, through the use of contextual extraction, and the 
aforementioned ‘facts’ we can infer these relationships 
in a number of ways, using prepositions, parts-of-speech 
tagging and Boolean operators that specify distance 
between words and other parameters. As the examples 
discussed in this paper refer to data from Twitter only, 
these relationships are done on a ‘per sentence’ basis. Fig-
ure 4 shows how this works in practice.
From these rules we can begin to make some assump-
tions about the entities being extracted. For example, it 
is now possible to ascertain with a degree of confidence 
that specific locations are in reference to a specific event. 
At this point, it is important to acknowledge the chal-
lenges posed by the use of SMS-language (textese) as 
communication via services such as Twitter do not nec-
essarily adhere to strict grammar or syntax conventions. 
Although a number of novel approaches to handle this 
type of language are in development (see, for example 
[21]) due to the use of examples that use accepted, formal 
terminology, we do not address this issue here.
By using context–sensitive concept matching using 
Language Interpretation/Text Interpretation (LITI) 
rules [19], concepts can be also matched to the specific 
context for which they are being used. Using the exam-
ple of a location, the use of a specific place in reference 
to an event or action, such as an arrest can be extracted 
by matching locations within proximity of text indicat-
ing an event followed by a preposition and the location. 
Such an approach brings about a number of potentially 
advantageous features. The use of contextual concept 
definitions enables increased levels of accuracy, and thus 
confidence, in the extracted data relative to the context 
in which it is being extracted. For example, instances of 
location that occur with a specified number of words, 
separated by a preposition, of terminology indicating an 
arrest, increases the level of confidence that the informa-
tion is in fact in reference to the context as opposed to 
just being any occurrence of a location name in the text. 
Social media sites such as Twitter often include features 
that enable location information to be captured directly 
from the browser or mobile application.
Geolocation
To provide location-based corroboration and visualisa-
tion, automatic extraction of named locations from the 
various data sources is used. Working from an exten-
sive collection of known locations, the detection and 
Fig. 4 Entity and fact extraction in social media
Table 1 Extracted entity examples
Entity Example
Location Atlanta
Boston
San Diego
Event Trafficking
Arrest
Transaction
Exploitation CSE
Forced labour
Forced prostitution
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word-level extraction of countries, regions and cities 
is performed. However, regions and cities are extracted 
as-is and further contextualisation is required to disam-
biguate the named location from others that share the 
same name. For example, the term New York could easily 
refer to either New York City or New York State.
Named locations are not extracted as locations alone; 
the rules within the OC ontology are used to extract 
locations against a given OC context where possible. 
One example is ‘trafficking location’ which uses rules to 
detect a context regarding an entity (individual, group, 
asset etc.) being trafficked or moved. Another example 
is ‘exploitation location’ which detects a named location 
against OC exploitation contexts (such as forced labour).
Reverse geocoding, the process of resolving one or 
more geographical coordinates from a named location, is 
applied to acquire the additional contextual information 
required (country, region, city, etc.) to perform effective 
corroboration and map-based visualisation. Disambigua-
tion of the location is also a resulting benefit; however 
this is based entirely on the popularity, size or impor-
tance of a location. For example, Washington State or 
Washington, DC are much larger and more widely ref-
erenced than Washington County in Alabama. If Wash-
ington, DC has the highest ranking then the location 
Washington will identified as Washington, DC.
The reverse geocoding process utilises the Google 
Maps API. Using this API, the named location is sup-
plied, returning a list of matching results, by order of rel-
evance based on the most commonly searched places (i.e. 
popularity), the size (i.e. population), or the importance 
(e.g. capital). Each result provides a geographical location 
in decimal latitude/longitude format, along with addi-
tional hierarchical information, for example, New York 
City is within NY or New York State, and within the US 
or United States of America. Since the Scanning System 
is primarily investigating a US-based dataset, searches 
are restricted to the boundary of the US. It is important 
to note that a single tweet may contain multiple named 
locations, in which case, all of these are resolved and the 
tweet is processed according to each of those locations.
Categorisation and filtering
In addition to extracting facts and entities from the input 
data, similar techniques are also utilised as the basis of a 
rule-based approach to classify content against a number 
of pre-defined categories. Membership to one or more 
of these categories is then used as the basis for content 
filtering. If the content analysed by the crawler does not 
meet the criteria of at least one of the rules within the 
parameters defined in the content categorisation process, 
it is then disregarded.
The categorisation model is defined using a similar 
approach to the entity and fact extraction model, utilis-
ing a number of ‘hand-crafted’ rules organised in a hier-
archical structure, with the only key difference being that 
rather than being designed to identify and extract specific 
pieces of data and/or information they aim to discern the 
relevance of the content against the defined topics using 
the same taxonomy structure defined in Fig. 2. The rules 
themselves use a range of techniques, again focusing on 
the identification of keywords and phrases. A number of 
examples of the phrases and keywords used as part of the 
categorisation taxonomy are shown in Table 2. Matched 
content is then assigned a ‘relevancy’ rating depending 
on the number of keywords and/or phrases that are met 
within the match criteria—as shown in Fig. 5.
A social media scanning system
To implement the content extraction and categorisation 
models, an integrated pipeline that facilitates the crawl-
ing of social media is put in place. This process manages 
and enables the seamless collection, restructuring, pro-
cessing, filtering and output of the data in preparation for 
further analysis. The stages of the data preparation and 
processing pipeline is shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 5 Categorization output
Table 2 Weak signals—keywords and phrases
Weak signal Keywords and phrases
Physical injury Subjected to violence
Timid
Forced to have sex
Women beaten
Physical appearance Provocative dress
Live with a group of women
Unhappy
Unable to leave place of residence Afraid to leave
Under control of others
Financially dependant
Irregular movement of individuals Men come and go at all hours
Women do not appear to leave
Lots of activity at night
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Different data sources lend themselves to the identifica-
tion and extraction of different kinds of information and 
indicators. For example, the data from the Web and RSS 
feeds used in the process allow for the extraction of data 
related to explicit instances of past and ongoing criminal-
ity, as reported by the media, law enforcement and other 
outlets. Such data can be used to enhance situational 
awareness, identifying key locations and trends in crimi-
nality by geographic region. Whereas as social media, 
although potentially useful in identifying similar infor-
mation, can also be used as a source of identifying ‘weak 
signals’, due to the presence of commentary and observa-
tions provided by everyday citizens. Though it should be 
acknowledged that these posts are particularly uncom-
mon when compared with the data collected from news 
outlets, journalists and other interest groups.
To extract and expose data to the processing pipeline 
and FCA components a number of approaches are used 
depending on the source type. Primarily, three different 
data types are used by the system; Social Media, Web 
pages and RSS feeds although this is flexible and can be 
adapted to include other disparate data types, both struc-
tured and unstructured. The process for extracting data 
from each varies fairly significantly from source to source. 
In the case of crawling pages from the web, a number of 
seed URLs from a hand-curated database are used as a 
starting point for the crawling process, with subsequent 
links within those target URLs also transversed. These 
seed URLs consist of local, regional and national news 
reporting mediums and law enforcement agency (LEA) 
web-pages. To filter out noise and irrelevant data an ini-
tial stage of categorisation is used to determine a base 
level of relevance to the domain, utilising keywords and 
phrases that indicate a surface level relation to crimi-
nality, disregarding any source data that does not meet 
the criteria defined by the rule-set. Continuing with the 
example of human trafficking and modern slavery that 
is used throughout, the initial filtering criteria contain 
rules that both explicitly refer to trafficking and forms of 
human exploitation and more subtle, nuanced, rules look 
for weak signals such as references to injury or signs of 
physical abuse, or the presence of paraphernalia that may 
be linked phenomena, such as drug cultivation. Simi-
larly, a curated set of RSS feeds use a similar method to 
web transversal, however these feeds are monitored for 
changes and updates, as opposed to being crawled peri-
odically in search of new content.
For social media however, as the main source of focus 
in this article, the approach is somewhat different. Uti-
lising the ‘Search API’ offered by Twitter [22], queries 
can be made against the service’s index of recent and/
or popular posts from the previous seven days, with 
only the most relevant tweets returned from during the 
time period. At the time of writing, the amount of data 
returned is limited by the API’s rate limit, currently set 
at 180 queries per 15 minutes. This amount is subject to 
change. In terms of the queries themselves, a number of 
pre-defined operators exist that allow for the matching 
of keywords, exact phrases and other operations. When 
dealing with larger sources of unstructured data, such as 
web-pages or other documents, it is often necessary to 
heuristically parse the content to remove additional page 
elements such advertisements before processing. How-
ever, as the data extracted from Twitter is already suffi-
ciently structured, this step is not needed here.
Using the same example as in previous figures, the 
XML enables this content to be extracted alongside 
other meta-data, such as the geolocation and other 
details about the author, the data and time that the post 
was made, the date/time it was extracted by the crawler, 
keywords used to query the API, and a URL link back to 
the original content. Other metadata is also provided by 
default, but has been filtered as it is not essential to the 
process being described. An example of the XML output 
is shown in the code snippet below.
Fig. 6 Social media scanning process
<xml version=” 1 .0 ” encoding=”utf−8”>
<art ic le>
<authorgeolocation>Atlanta , GA</authorgeolocation>
<query> t r a f f i c k i n g</query>
<body>People t r a f f i c k e d in to Atlanta f o r sex , labour and
organ removal accord ing to a new repor t</body>
<pdate>20150129</pdate>
<categories>top\HumanTrafficking\Exp lo i t a t i on \ s exua l</
categories>
<TraffickingLocation>Atlanta</ TraffickingLocation>
<ExploitationLocation>Atlanta</ExploitationLocation>
<ExploitationType>Sexual ; Labour ; Organ Harvest ing</
ExploitationType>
</ art ic le>
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Applying formal concept analysis
Background to formal concept analysis
A formal description of formal concepts [23] begins with 
a set of objects X and a set of attributes Y. A binary rela-
tion I ⊆ X × Y  is called the formal context. If x ∈ X and 
y ∈ Y  then xIy says that object x has attribute y. For a set 
of objects A ⊆ X , a derivation operator ↑ is defined to 
obtain the set of attributes common to the objects in A 
as follows:
Similarly, for a set of attributes B ⊆ Y  , the ↓ operator is 
defined to obtain the set of objects common to the attrib-
utes in B as follows:
(A, B) is a formal concept iff A↑ = B and B↓ = A . The 
relations A× B are then a closed set of pairs in I. In other 
words, a formal concept is a set of attributes and a set of 
objects such that all of the objects have all of the attrib-
utes, there are no other objects that have all of the attrib-
utes and there are no other attributes that all the objects 
have. A is called the extent of the formal concept and B is 
called the intent of the formal concept.
A formal context is typically represented as a cross 
table, with crosses indicating binary relations between 
objects (rows) and attributes (columns). Table  3 is a 
small example of a formal context where the objects are 
information sources and the attributes are named enti-
ties, signals of crime categories and values present in the 
information sources.
Formal concepts in a cross table can be visualised as 
closed rectangles of crosses, where the rows and columns 
in the rectangle are not necessarily contiguous. FC1 , 
below, is a example of a formal concept from the Organ-
ised Crime formal context above:
FC1:
({Crime THB, LocationA},
{Source 1, Source 2, Source 5, Source 7, Source 9})
Typically, as the number of attributes in a formal concept 
increase, the corresponding number of objects that share 
those attributes reduces—the objects become more spe-
cialised. This behaviour can be seen in FC2 , below, with 
the addition of the attribute Category Exploitation:
FC2:
({Crime THB, LocationA,Category Exploitation},
{Source 5, Source 7, Source 9})
FC2 is said to be a sub-concept of FC1 . These connec-
tions between formal concepts are fundamental in formal 
A↑ :=
{
y ∈ Y | ∀x ∈ A : xIy
}
.
B↓ :=
{
x ∈ X | ∀y ∈ B : xIy
}
.
concept analysis (FCA) and can be visualised as a formal 
concept tree. Figure 7 shows a formal concept tree derived 
from the Oganised Crime formal context. Each node is a 
formal concept. The tree can be read by understanding 
that objects are inherited by formal concepts from the 
right and attributes are inherited by formal concepts from 
the left. Thus, for example, formal concept 1 in the tree 
is FC1 , above, and formal concept 6 in the tree is FC2 , 
above.
The power of FCA to cluster similar objects and to cap-
ture increasing specialism make it an ideal technique for 
corroborating information sources and providing ‘drill 
down’ from highly corroborated information at a gen-
eral level to further, more detailed, information at a more 
specialised level. Furthermore, the automated tools now 
available for FCA make it applicable in areas where large 
volumes of data are being analysed.
Corroborating information using formal concept analysis
A single tweet containing a weak signal of OC is not a 
sensible basis for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) 
to take action. However, if a number of sources contain 
weak signals of the same element of OC from the same 
location, then this may form a credible basis to warrant 
further investigation. Such corroboration can be auto-
mated by the application of FCA [23] to the structured 
data extracted from the information sources. FCA can 
be used to cluster the sources into what we will call OC 
Threat Concepts (or simply OC Concepts) where one 
shared attribute is a location and another shared attribute 
is an element of OC. When mining the data for formal 
concepts, if a minimum support is set, say of ten informa-
tion sources, only OC Threat Concepts with a least ten 
sources will be obtained.
To carry out FCA, the structured data extracted from 
the information sources must be converted into a for-
mal context using a process known as scaling [24, 25]. 
For example, each location in the data becomes a formal 
attribute in the context. If there are 100 locations in the 
data, there will be a corresponding 100 columns in the 
formal context, one for each location. The same approach 
applies to other named entities, such as drugs. To use 
ordinal data, such as dates or currency, these can be 
scaled using appropriate ranges or ‘bins’ of values.
The weak signals of elements of OC are scaled using 
the Taxonomy. So, for example, a weak signal may indi-
cate Human Trafficking, and thus the source in which 
the signal was contained will be labeled with the formal 
attribute Crime-HumanTrafficking. Several different 
weak signals may all point to Human Trafficking, and 
thus sources containing any of them would all be labeled 
with the attribute Crime-HumanTrafficking. Other weak 
signals may point to more specific elements of Human 
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Trafficking, such as Exploitation which is a component 
of Human Trafficking (from the taxonomy). A source 
with such a weak signal will be labeled with both Crime-
HumanTrafficking and Element-Exploitation. Thus the 
general ‘is a part of ’ rule in a taxonomy becomes natu-
rally captured by FCA (see Table 4). This type of scaling 
greatly adds to the process of corroboration: if there are 
five sources of information containing weak signals of 
THB and five sources containing weak signals of Sex-
ual Exploitation, for example, this implies there are ten 
sources containing weak signals of THB.
A similar approach is used making use of information 
available from the Google Maps API. The deep geolo-
cation context, particularly the hierarchical structure, 
allows the FCA process to cluster locations at various 
levels. For a given location, each element of the resolved 
location hierarchy is used in the formal context as shown 
in Table 5.
Using this approach, FCA detects and corroborates 
entities within locations at various levels in the hierarchy. 
The detected concepts are then viewable at the country, 
state and city levels and can be navigated using the for-
mal concept tree discussed above.
Experimental implementation
Using a data set created from 29,096 tweets as informa-
tion sources, obtained by scanning for tweets contain-
ing weak signals of OC, a formal context was created by 
scaling the extracted structured data as described above. 
Using a minimum support of 80 tweets, the context was 
mined for OC Threat Concepts using a modification of 
the open-source In-Close concept miner [26]. The result 
is visualised as a formal concept tree in Fig. 8.
In the tree, the head node is the concept containing all 
the tweets from concepts that satisfy the minimum sup-
port (5512 tweets) and each of the branches is to an OC 
concept—a concept where one attribute is a location and 
another is an OC. In this example, every OC is Human 
Trafficking as this was the type of OC being searched for 
by the Scanning System. The number inside each node 
is simply a concept ID number assigned by the concept 
miner. The number outside the node, below the list of 
attributes, is the object count (the number of tweets con-
tained in the concept) and in each case this is above the 
Table 4 A formal context scaling part of the OC taxonomy (CSE is child sexual exploitation)
OC taxonomy Human trafficking Exploitation Sexual CSE
Source containing weak signal of THB ×
Source containing weak signal of exploitation × ×
Source containing weak signal of sexual exploitation × × ×
Source containing weak signal of CSE × × × ×
Table 5 A formal context demonstrating hierarchical 
location scaling
US New York State New York City
Country-level ×
State-level × ×
City-level × × ×
Fig. 7 A formal concept tree derived from the organised crime formal context
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minimum support threshold of 80. Thus concept 53, for 
example, has the attributes authorlocation-Atlanta and 
Crime-HumanTrafficking, and has 185 objects (tweets). 
In other words, within the data set there are 185 tweets 
that have the author location Atlanta and contain a weak 
signal of Human Trafficking. With this high level of cor-
roboration, a police analyst will be alerted to investigate 
this further, and a possible next step in the investigation 
is automated by FCA in the form of a ‘drill-down’ to the 
OC concept’s sub-concepts.
OC concept drill‑down
The OC concepts in Fig. 8 contain limited information—
they only have a location and the OC Human Trafficking. 
However, individual tweets in the OC concept may con-
tain further information pertinent to the OC. But physi-
cally inspecting 185 tweets, although far less work than 
examining 29,096 tweets, is nonetheless quite time con-
suming. However, several tweets in the OC concept may 
all share the same additional information and this can be 
divulged by examining the sub-concepts of an OC con-
cept. Each of the sub-concepts will have the same loca-
tion and crime as the original OC concept but with one 
or more additional attributes from the structured data 
extracted from the tweets. Such a result can easily be 
obtained by mining the data for concepts that contain the 
attributes of the OC concept and at the same time reduc-
ing the minimum support required.
Figure  9 shows a concept tree with the ‘Atlanta’ OC 
concept from Fig. 8 and its sub-concepts produced when 
the minimum support is set to 5.
In the tree, concept 3 shows that 10 of the 185 ‘Atlanta’ 
tweets also contain a reference to the drug ampheta-
mine. They may not all contain the actual word ampheta-
mine, but they will all contain a word or phrase that is 
commonly used to mean or refer to amphetamine. But 
using lists of such words and phrases, the entity extrac-
tion process carried to produce the structured data will 
thus label each of these tweets with the attribute drug-
amphetamine, which in turn enables the FCA to group 
them together.
Fig. 8 Tree of OC concepts
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Concept 2 shows that 6 of the 185 Atlanta tweets 
also contain the location Central America and the 
county Mexico. Furthermore, a semantic rule in the 
entity extraction process has determined that Mexico 
is being referred to in the tweet as a trafficking loca-
tion and thus these tweets are labeled with the attribute 
traffickinglocation-Mexico.
Concept 1 shows that 10 of the 185 Atlanta tweets con-
tain weak signals of the OC Human Trafficking element 
Exploitation and the exploitation type Sexual. Further-
more, in 8 of those 10 tweets there are weak signals of 
CSE, further specialising the OC.
Thus, through this simple automated process, the 
police analyst has potentially more information that 
may be pertinent to an OC and more specific informa-
tion regarding the nature of the OC. Because the original 
OC concept involved corroboration by a large number of 
sources, the analyst can gain some confidence that fur-
ther information contained in sub-sets of the tweets has 
credibility. Indeed, the analyst may now want to trace 
back to the original tweets (or to the text of these tweets) 
and, because they have been grouped together by FCA, it 
is simple task to provide this facility.
Implementation for end‑users
The processes and components described above were 
implemented as a part of the European ePOOLICE Pro-
ject [2]. The OC Taxonomy and entity extraction com-
ponents developed by the authors were implemented in 
the system to provide data to be consumed by various 
analytic components, one of which was the FCA OC 
Threat corroboration component described above. The 
user interface was developed in close collaboration with 
Law Enforcement Agency end-users, using a map-based 
approach. The system allows a police analyst to select 
a region and type of OC to scan for and then acquire 
sources on the Internet (such as tweets) that match those 
search criteria. Structured data is extracted automatically 
from the sources, as described above, allowing the user to 
carry out a variety of analytic tasks and display the results 
in an appropriate visualisation. Figure 10 shows the user 
interface with the FCA ‘Corroborated Threats’ option 
selected. There are a number of other options listed on 
the left of the screen and these components were devel-
oped by other members of the ePOOLICE consortium 
[2]. However, it is outside the scope of this article to 
describe these other components here.
The map in Fig.  10 is displaying the OC concepts as 
described in the example above. Various icons are used 
by the system to indicate types of OC and the one here 
is for Human Trafficking. The analyst is able to click on 
an OC concept icon to display its information (essentially 
this is the attributes and objects of the concept) and drill 
down to its sub-concepts. Figure  11 shows the ‘Atlanta’ 
OC concept with its associated information, including its 
attributes (crime: humantrafficking and location: atlanta) 
and its objects (tweets), listed as URLs allowing the ana-
lyst to trace back to the original sources. The sub-con-
cepts are displayed as icons below the original concept 
and Fig.  12 shows the additional information displayed 
when one of these sub-concepts is clicked on—in this 
case the attribute drug: amphetamine. The 10 sources 
that contain a reference to amphetamine are listed and 
at this point the analyst may wish to look at some of 
these. Clicking on a URL will take the user to the original 
source. Above the lists of attributes and sources is a list 
of categories. These are categories that are referred to in 
one or more of the sources in the OC concept, but not in 
all of them. Thus they give the analyst further informa-
tion of interest but without an indication of their level of 
corroboration.
Evaluation
Although difficult to evaluate in an operational sense 
(we cannot, for example, act as the police in investigat-
ing organised crime) it is possible to say something about 
the quality of the results in terms of the accuracy of the 
weak signals identified. A sample of 20 inferred OC cate-
gories were selected by police experts as having the great-
est potential for providing information useful to their 
Fig. 9 Drill-down for the ‘Atlanta’ OC concept
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Fig. 10 ePOOLICE system showing OC concepts
Fig. 11 ePOOLICE system showing San Diego and Atlanta OC concepts and details of the Atlanta OC concept
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investigations and these were inspected against the origi-
nal text sources, with 16 out of 20 correctly identified 
from weak signals as being crime related. In the other 
four cases, the context within which the identified words 
or phrases were used clearly indicated that the source 
was not referring to OC. Although only a small sample, 
this was an encouraging level of false positives. However, 
further evaluation is required on larger samples to pro-
duce a statistically significant result.
In order to test the accuracy of the developed content 
categorisation and named-entity extraction models, an 
evaluation set of 164 Twitter posts was selected from 
the existing larger corpus that is used as the exemplar 
throughout this paper. The particular tweets selected 
were done so randomly, however provision was made 
to remove duplicate ‘retweets’ or posts that were simply 
identical to others already contained within the evalua-
tion set, so as to ensure a broader range of entities and 
rules within the model were tested. The reason for the 
selection of a relatively small corpus of test data was to 
enable the manual categorisation of the named entities 
contained within the data, utilising the domain knowl-
edge embedded within the research team in order to 
establish, based on the rules and categories known within 
the model, the areas of best fit for the content under 
analysis. The manual assessment allowed for the use of 
human intuition to denote when proper nouns referring 
to places etc. were in fact referring to a place, regardless 
of capitalisation, a process much more difficult when 
using automated tools. Similarly the human assessment 
can account for errors in grammar, spelling and other 
issues which may have prevented a successful match 
using the automated tools, in addition to accounting for 
words or phrases that may be indicative of a particular 
form of exploitation or crime that may not be contained 
within the taxonomy and ruleset used by the automated 
tools. To reduce the risk of error in the manual process, 
the evaluators were initially briefed by a police specialist 
in the use of social media as an intelligence source.
The same data-set was then processed through the 
model using the developed NLP model and tools, and the 
resulting .csv outputs compared to determine the accu-
racy of the automated approach. The evaluation was done 
so on a binary basis, with a 1 value awarded in instances 
where the results of the analysis matched exactly, and 
a null value awarded if the results did not match. The 
results of the evaluation by output field are presented 
as percentages in Fig.  13 indicating the success ratio of 
the automated approach. A subsequent analysis was also 
conducted to determine the number of false-positives 
returned using the automated model, that is the the 
number of non-null values which do not match the value 
Fig. 12 ePOOLICE system showing drill-down information
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returned during the manual processing of the same data-
set. The results of this analysis are included as a separate 
series in Fig. 13.
In a number of areas, the model returned results accu-
rately 100% of the time. For entities such as ‘pdate’ (date 
of posting), author and organisation this was due to the 
rules determining their extraction simply identifying 
the presence of raw values from the data. In the case 
of pdate and author these are pre-defined fields in the 
source content provided through the Twitter API. For 
Organisation this is done through existing supervised 
learning techniques embedded within the SAS Content 
Categorisation software which are built through reading 
in a large dataset of organisation names against which 
rules are generated using well established techniques 
such as Hidden Markov Models and Decision Trees 
[27]. In instances where the automated model was 100% 
accurate, it is expected that the results indicate 0% false 
positives.
The decline in accuracy of location extraction enti-
ties continent, country and city as they become more 
granular can be attributed to the fact that the model uses 
simple lookup-tables of known locations as the basis 
of the extraction. While the number of continents and 
countries and the various names to which they are often 
referred is relatively finite, the number of towns and cities 
in the United States alone means that this simple method 
of extraction can be prohibitive for entities where poten-
tial range of values to be returned is vast. This difficulty is 
also reflected in the increasing number of false positives 
recorded for these entities due to the potential for place 
names to be the same as common nouns.
For other entities such as exploitationlocation, traf-
fickinglocation and arrestlocation the results are again 
Fig. 13 Content categorisation and named-entity extraction evaluation results
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varied. In this instance, predicate rules which look for 
separate entities such as Location alongside syntax 
which may indicate the presence of exploitation, arrest 
or trafficking within the same sentence were used. 
While useful to an extent, the rules by their nature are 
limited. The cognitive abilities of a human analyst with 
knowledge of the domain may be able to infer that, for 
example, an individual being recovered from a par-
ticular location is likely to have been exploited in that 
same location, whereas the rules used rigidly rely on 
the explicit presence of language indicating exploita-
tion has taken place. A large number of false-positives 
for these entities are also returned. This again reflects 
the value of human cognition in the sense-making pro-
cess. While the example provided in Fig. 4 demonstrates 
how these rules can work well, small changes to the syn-
tax could have resulted in the return of a false positive. 
For instance if the text had said “Atlanta news reports 
Human Trafficking issues across the country” the ruleset 
would still return Atlanta as a trafficking location, where 
as a human analyst could infer that a more appropriate 
location would be the United States, or that it’s not really 
possible to determine a location at all based on the infor-
mation provided.
A further qualitative evaluation was provided by 24 
end-users during a hands-on feedback session held in 
December 2015. Various law enforcement agencies from 
within the EU were represented, including those from 
regional, national and international organisations, from 
countries including the UK, France, Spain, Belgium and 
Estonia. For the evaluation, users were first given an 
introduction to, and demonstration of the system, by a 
facilitation team from the ePOOLICE project, highlight-
ing both an overview of what it aims to do at a conceptual 
level and a practical guide to its features, functions and 
user interface. Participants were then invited to test the 
system, and asked to provide qualitative feedback on usa-
bility and utility. This feedback was collated using physi-
cal questionnaires at the end of the test and through an 
interactive debrief session where they were able to pass 
comments and ask further questions about the system to 
the facilitation team. The feedback gleaned highlighted 
factors such as the need to refer potentially personal and 
sensitive information about the origins of the identified 
indicators so they could be followed up, and, the com-
plexity of the way in which the systems outputs were pre-
sented via the map-based interface. However, feedback 
regarding the utility of the system in providing a means 
to show trends in current, and alluding to emerging, 
forms of criminality in different geographic areas was 
overwhelmingly positive, especially through the utilisa-
tion of previously untapped data sources such as social 
media.
Related work
Until relatively recently, commercial web-crawling sys-
tems have tended to focus on providing market research 
for clients’ products and services. A prominent exam-
ple of this is the sentiment analysis work carried out by 
SAS using keyword search combined with taxonomy-
based text-mining [28]. However, companies are adapting 
these systems to provide intelligence to law enforcement 
agencies [29]. BlueJay software, made by BrightPlanet, 
was able to monitor social media during high profile 
events and illicit activities, to aid LEAs in the collection 
of incriminating evidence, although the service has now 
been discontinued due to the increasing cost of access-
ing Twitter data [30]. OpenMIND advertises the ability 
to crawl the “deep web”—inaccessible to search engines 
but accessible to their software—to provide agencies 
with “actionable intelligence” [31]. The majority of these 
tools are designed to be used by the companies that 
made them, to provide data and intelligence to LEAs as 
a service. By contrast, the ePOOLICE system has been 
designed with the police as end-user in mind, provid-
ing constant, ‘in house’, monitoring and a user interface 
designed for the police analyst. However, LexisNexis, 
have also developed a “next-generation” policing plat-
form designed for use by LEAs, for crime analysis and 
investigation. The platform is called Accurint Virtual 
Crime Center, and links different data types on peo-
ple, places, vehicles, phones and other information into 
one visual dashboard. As such, Accurint Virtual Crime 
Center perhaps comes closest to what the ePOOLICE 
system is attempting. However, the LexisNexis approach 
is based on accessing and fusing data from existing data-
bases (such as national law enforcement databases and 
public records databases) rather than obtaining intelli-
gence from scanning the Internet and social media. Thus, 
Accurint Virtual Crime Center provides investigators 
with a central access point and analytics for large volumes 
of dispersed and disparate data, but without the immedi-
ate and real-time monitoring provided by ePOOLICE.
In terms of current research, probably the most promi-
nent example that bears similarities with ePOOLICE 
is the work being carried out at Cardiff University, UK, 
developing a system to scan social media to predict out-
breaks of hate crime [32]. Researchers are building a 
machine-learning based classifier to distinguish tweets 
displaying hateful or antagonistic views with a focus on 
race, ethnicity, or religion [33]. By identifying textual fea-
tures of such tweets, the idea is for the classier to be used 
to predict off-line hate crime based on the level of on-line 
‘cyber-hate’. It is interesting to note that the researchers 
used NLP to derive syntactic grammatical relationships 
in a tweet that can be used as features for classification to 
enrich their lexicon of cyber-hate beyond simple unigram 
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and bigram terms. This type of text analysis is central to 
the ePOOLICE entity and relation extraction system (as 
described above). However, whereas the Cardiff system 
is intended as a predictive tool, ePOOLICE is focused 
on information extraction and visualisation. It was this 
focus, and the proven track-record of tools such as SAS’s 
text mining software, that provided the motivation in 
ePOOLICE to exclude machine learning in its processes. 
Nevertheless, if a predictive element was to be added 
to the ePOOLICE system, clearly a machine learning 
approach would be appropriate. Indeed, in a similar, par-
allel, European project (project ATHENA [34], in which 
the authors’ organisation was a partner), machine learn-
ing was added as a means of assessing the credibility of 
information in social media [35].
Increasingly, organised forms of crime, particularly those 
which involve human exploitation; modern slavery, human 
trafficking and CSE take place in some capacity online. 
With the proliferation of these ‘cyber-enabled’ crimes 
[36], the vectors through which individuals are recruited, 
deceived and coerced into exploitation has expanded 
exponentially [37]. The use of social media, classified ads 
and other internet mediums is now widespread in human 
trafficking cases, including those associated both labour 
and sexual exploitation, and domestic servitude [37, 38]. 
The internet provides a venue for both the recruitment, 
deception and coercion of potential victims, and for the 
sale of illicit goods and services that use trafficked labour 
and sex-workers [39]. Meanwhile, the dark-web and pri-
vate message-boards facilitate the dissemination of CSE 
material [40]. Though this era of online crime has opened 
up new commercial opportunities for criminals to expand 
their illicit enterprises, it has also created a resource that 
can be leveraged by law enforcement in response, and 
work to make use of this information has already begun.
Indeed, the use of software tools to extract, analyse and 
visualise detected indicators of human trafficking is not a 
process unique to the research we have presented. Existing 
studies, such as that by Ibanez [41], have sought to utilise 
open-source data from message boards and classified ads. 
Such information, when combined with social network 
and phone number analyses has been used to successfully 
detect the movement patterns of traffickers and their vic-
tims. While Ibanez’s study, at the time of its publication, 
was reliant on the manual analysis of open source data—
it does acknowledge the potential future utility of web 
crawling and natural language processing (NLP). As we 
have demonstrated through our research, automated data 
extraction and analysis opens the doors to a more expan-
sive and efficient approach to indicator identification.
Other work, such as that by Poelmans [42] has 
shown the potential value of FCA in combating organ-
ised crime, and in the case of this work; the specific 
challenge of human trafficking. In this particular 
case, FCA was leveraged as part of a ‘Temporal Con-
cept Analysis’ on archival policing reports. The tech-
niques were used with some success to build a profile 
and eventually identify potential suspects who may be 
involved in human trafficking based on historical data.
Approaches which look to leverage the value of 
OSINT through automated crawling and analysis have 
also been employed by researchers working in other 
areas of crime and security [43]. Popular applications 
include those associated with Child Sexual Exploita-
tion (CSE) material [44], through to the detection of 
extremist propaganda and terrorist communities [44] 
and the identification of civil unrest [45, 46]. While 
many of these approaches deal with text and metadata, 
other tools are being developed which seek to analyse 
multimedia data, such as video and images, for illicit 
content [47, 48].
More generally, social media data is being used in 
a variety of ways as researchers experiment with new 
and novel applications to detect and potentially pre-
vent crime using data derived from the medium. In 
one such example, social media has been used as a way 
to try and better understand and explain the location 
of criminal incidents. For example, Bendler et al. [49] 
theorised and proved that theft and robbery incidents 
were more likely in locations with increased social 
activities, whereas the opposite was true for vehicle 
theft.
We can conclude from this review of related work 
that social media is actively being studied and used as 
a source of intelligence and that steps have been made 
to automate the process. However, the focus has been 
predominantly on keyword searching with the nota-
ble exception of the machine learning approach being 
taken at Cardiff University [33]. Thus there is a clear 
gap in this area for the application of NLP to obtain 
potentially useful intelligence from sources that would 
otherwise be overlooked. The development of the 
notion of ‘weak signals’, tied to a formal taxonomy of 
OC and a set of semantic rule, has the potential to give 
the analyst a situational awareness that is fuller and 
richer than currently possible. There is also a gap in 
the analytical capability of exiting approaches—the 
majority tend to be focused on information gathering, 
leaving the analyst to decide how to process and uti-
lise the information and potentially lead to a situation 
of information overload, particularly given the huge 
amount of online content available. Here, this gap if 
filled with the application of FCA and the provision of 
a map-based interface. The FCA automatically clusters 
sources at geographic locations, filters out sources that 
are not corroborated and gives the analyst the facility 
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to drill down into clusters of interest to reveal more 
detail.
Conclusion and further work
In this paper we have demonstrated how FCA can be 
used in combination with map based visualisation, data 
extraction and NLP techniques to extract and classify 
data to detect, through social media, the presence of 
corroborated organised crime threats. Establishing the 
idea of ‘weak signals’ as the presence of key words and 
phrases that point to criminality, the approach shows one 
way in which social media can be used as the basis for the 
development of intelligence from open-sources (OSINT). 
This intelligence can be used by police and other law 
enforcement agencies as they seek to adopt new tech-
nologies to build situational awareness to aid in the fight 
against transnational organised crime threats like Human 
Trafficking.
This paper has shown how using Named Entity Recog-
nition (NRE) allows for the detection and extraction of 
named locations within a given piece of text. The process 
used in this paper focused on sentence-level extraction 
which appears to provide reasonable results on Twit-
ter data. This is due to the limited nature of the content 
provided in each source, or tweet, when only the source 
itself is being used—for example, by not extracting fur-
ther information from the user’s profile or surround-
ing content. Using sentence-level extraction on other 
sources, such as news articles, often misses important 
contextual information given in neighbouring sentences, 
such as the country or state that the given named loca-
tion is within. For NRE to be effective at extracting 
locations with greater accuracy, then full-content-level 
extraction would be required, which in itself introduces 
further challenges. Performing NRE based on a list of 
known locations also has the challenge of identifying 
words that whilst real locations, are not likely to be loca-
tions in the given context. Such words that have been 
observed in this project include “buy”, “sell”, and “god” 
which are all names of real locations but were being used 
in their normal sense. More sophisticated rule-based 
extraction is required to ensure the author of the content 
is actually referring to a location by detecting language 
such as “in Madrid” or even common article layouts 
such as “MADRID—A man was detained yesterday, sus-
pected of being the ringleader of a major forced labour 
syndicate”.
Disambiguating locations once extracted focuses on 
the challenge of handling locations with common or 
similar names. Typically, this is done statistically by using 
only most relevant or largest place which presents a risk 
of false positives. Probability states that when an source is 
talking about Washington, it is referring to Washington, 
DC rather than Washington County, Alabama, or any 
number of other places called Washington. However, 
this will not always be true and may not be suitable in the 
context of OC. Therefore, wider contextual extraction is 
imperative in order to provide more accurate results. The 
presence in the text of other location-based information 
could also be exploited for disambiguation, for example 
a mention of a building or place in Washington, DC in 
addition to the location Washington.
Location granularity proved to be another issue. Whilst 
the identification of towns and cities may be useful at a 
strategic level, at the operational level is it often specific 
houses or buildings that are important. However, there 
may be many houses with the same number and street 
name, even within the same geographical area (London 
Road, for example, is a very popular road name in the 
UK). Again, the presence in the text of other location-
based information could help identify the actual house. 
The use of location-base coding systems, such as Post-
codes in the UK or ZIP Codes in the US, may provide 
additional means of extracting specific locations.
Issues of context also apply to other named entities, 
such as drugs. Whilst we have successfully implemented 
comprehensive lists of drug names, including the vari-
ous slang terms used, false positives will continue to be a 
problem unless we can detect more contextual informa-
tion to confirm them. ‘Weed’ and ‘grass’ are well-known 
terms for the leaf form of cannabis, for example, but 
including information sources about gardening would 
clearly not useful in the context of combating OC. Fur-
ther development of rule-based text mining is required to 
help identity OC as being the context.
Further work is also required in the detection of false 
information in malicious, joke or hoax sources. This area 
has been explored by a number of researchers, such as 
[50–52] using a variety of approaches including machine 
learning and NLP. Adding such a level of credibility 
assessment to the filtering process will further enhance 
the effectiveness of the system presented here.
Nevertheless, given the limitations above and the fur-
ther work required, the current system has shown that 
it is quite capable of providing useful information in the 
detection of organised crime threats, as evidenced by the 
evaluation given above. The system has also been suc-
cessfully adapted as part of the European ATHENA Pro-
ject [34] where social media is used to provide situational 
awareness for crisis management [53]. The system has 
also be adapted as part of an Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT) Hub in the Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, 
Resilience, Intelligence and Organised Crime Research 
(CENTRIC) at Sheffield Hallam University. In particular 
the approaches used to crawl, filter, analyse and extract 
data from the web and social media have been adapted 
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for these purposes. In ATHENA, an evolved version 
of the same processing pipeline described here is used 
alongside a taxonomy and ruleset designed to identify 
and extract information about crises, such as natural 
disasters, terrorist attacks and other events. Within the 
OSINT hub, the same techniques are also adapted, in a 
more exploratory manner, as part of a wider initiative 
to explore the broader value and utility of information 
from open-sources in providing situational awareness for 
LEAs, and to supplement existing forms of evidence in 
live investigations.
In summary, this work makes a number of contribu-
tion to the field: A novel, semantic, approach to identify 
OC intelligence in social media via the development of a 
set of ‘weak signals’ that has the benefit of finding infor-
mation that would otherwise be overlooked; a new rule-
based approach to categorise and organise information 
into structured data; a novel FCA-based approach to 
deal with information overload, provide corroboration of 
information and provide a framework for analysis based 
on geographic location and information drill-drown. It 
is hoped that these contributions will be of interest and 
useful to police practitioners and researchers in this 
field.
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